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1 Introduction
Most analyses of the regulation of polluting firms have assumed private firms. This assumption
ignores an important feature of a number of regulatory settings: the active role of public and
(partially) privatized firms as providers of goods and services. As a result of the process of
market liberalization in Western Europe and of the transition process in the countries compris-
ing the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Asia, mixed market structures are becoming
increasingly common. Actually, public firms compete with private firms in many highly pollut-
ing sectors such as energy supply, transportation, iron and steel, chemicals and petrochemicals.
They are responsible for releasing large amounts of toxic compounds that accumulates in the
environment causing present as well as long-term environmental damages. Thus, the issue of
the environmental regulation of mixed markets deserves important consideration.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse efficiency-inducing taxation when the market is
served by private and public (or partially privatized) providers. In this connection, we would
like to address two questions. First, we want to understand how the mixed market structure
affects the design of the optimal corrective tax. Second, we are interested in the welfare effect of
privatization when optimal taxation is used before and after privatization. With these purposes
in mind, we introduce a partially privatized firm in the model studied by Benchekroun and
Van Long (1998).
In line with the literature on mixed oligopolies, we assume that firms with different owner-
ship structures differ in their aims. Since the privatized firm is partly privately owned and partly
state-owned, its objective reflects the different interests of its public and private shareholders.
Following Bös (1991) and Matsumura (1998) we describe the payoff function of the privatized
firm as a weighted average of social welfare and its own profit.
We obtain an irrelevance result. Namely, we find that the optimal linear markovian tax rule
which decentralizes the social optimum as an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the differential
oligopoly game is independent of the degree of privatization of the public firm. Thus, the
optimal environmental policy tells us that technologically identical firms must be taxed the
same whatever their ownership status. Furthermore, this result is robust to changes in the
information structure of the differential oligopoly game considered. Indeed, the optimal tax rule
remains independent of the extent of privatization if we assume that oligopolists use closed-loop
strategies. Turning to the welfare effects of privatization, we prove that welfare is unchanged
by privatization when the optimal tax rule is used. This result stems directly from the fact that
the social optimum is independent of the degree of privatization and thus unique.
These results generalize previous irrelevance results obtained by White (1996), Poyago-
Theotoky (2001), Myles (2002), Sepahvand (2004), Claude and Hindriks (2006), Tomaru (2006)
to the case of optimal environmental regulation in an explicitly dynamic regulatory setting.
Our irrelevance result suggests that mixed oligopolies and private oligopolies should not
differ substantially in terms of economic and environmental performance if pollution charge
programs are correctly designed. This result seems consistent with experience and empirical
evidence which indicate that the economic and environmental consequences of privatization
reforms are mixed and vary substantially across sectors and countries1. Privatization conveys
promises of increased productive efficiency and more efficient use of resources, improved ac-
cess to capital markets and greater investments in cleaner technologies, better management
practices and easier access to markets for environmentally friendly goods and services. How-
ever, it also involves costs. For example, the decrease in supply as a result of the exercise
1For a recent survey of empirical studies of privatization, see Megginson and Netter (2001). Environmental
implications of privatisation are extensively reviewed in Lovei and Gentry (2002).
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of increased market power may result in a larger economic deadweight loss. In most cases
analysed to date, the quality of environmental regulations and commercial pressure have been
playing a preeminent role in the successes and failures of privatization reforms. Environmental
tax exemptions or lax environmental regulations have resulted in poor environmental perfor-
mance, whatever the ownership structure of the industry (e.g., Lovei and Gentry 2002).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model.
Section 3 characterizes the social optimum. Optimal corrective tax rules are derived for open-
loop and closed-loop mixed markets in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 The Model
Consider a mixed market consisting of one public firm (indexed by 0) and n identical private
firms (indexed by 1,2, ...,n). Market competition takes place a la Cournot-Nash over the con-
tinuous time period [0,∞[. In each period, firms face a downward sloping inverse demand
function p = P(Q) where Q ≡ ∑ni=0 qi with qi denoting the quantity produced by firm i. The
total cost function of firm i is Ci(qi) with Ci(0) = 0, C′i(qi) > 0 and C′′i (qi) ≥ 0. We assume
that technology is identical across private firms; i.e., Ci(q) =C1(q),∀q > 0 and ∀i= 1,2, . . . ,n.
However, it may differ between public and private firms; i.e., C0(q)≥C1(q), ∀q > 0.
Production of good q generates emissions of a stock pollutant. Firm i’s level of pollution emis-
sions is ei = qi. The dynamics of the stock of pollution S is described by
S˙(t) = Q(t)−δS(t), S(0) = S0 ≥ 0, (1)
where the coefficient δ > 0 reflects the environment’s self-cleaning capacity and S0 is the initial
size of the pollution stock.
The welfare of society at time t depends on the current vector of production decisions q(t) =
(q0(t),q1(t), . . . ,qn(t)) and the current stock of pollution S(t). It is measured by the sum of
consumers’ and producers’ surplus less environmental damages. At time t social welfare is
given by
w(t) =
q0(t)+∑ni=1 qi(t)∫
0
P(u)du−C0(q0(t))−∑ni=1Ci(qi(t))−D(S(t)), (2)
where the damage function D(.) measures the economic loss resulting from the current stock
of pollution S(t) and satisfies D(0) = 0, D′(0) = 0, and D′(S)> 0, D′′(S)> 0,∀S > 0. Further-
more, we assume that P(0)>C′i(0),∀i = 0,1, . . . ,n.
The social optimum q∗(t) =
(
q∗0(t),q
∗
1(t), . . . ,q
∗
n(t)
)
is defined as the solution of the following
problem:
maxq(t)≥0W =
∫ ∞
0
w(t)e−rtdt, (3)
s.t. S˙(t) = Q(t)−δS(t), S(0) = S0 ≥ 0, q(t)≥ 0.
Following Benchekroun and Van Long (1998), we suppose that the regulator uses linear Markov
tax rules to regulate pollution. Namely, we assume that each firm is charged a tax τi[S(t)] per
unit of output, where the unit tax depends only on the current pollution stock S(t).
The timing of the environmental regulation game is as follows. Prior to market competition,
the regulator announces the markovian tax scheme τ(S) = (τ0(S), τ1(S), . . . , τn(S)) that will be
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applicable to the firms. Then, firms engage in Cournot competition at each subsequent instant
of time t ∈ [0,∞[ taking as given the tax policy followed by the regulator.
In the remainder of this section, we define firms’ objective functions, specify the informa-
tion structure of the game and state the problem that the environmental regulator must solve.
The Polluting Oligopoly Let us assume that the environmental regulator imposes a tax τi(S)
on each unit of pollution produced by firm i (i = 0,1,2, . . . ,n). Then, firm i’s instantaneous
profit level is pii(t)=P[qi+Q−i(t)]qi−Ci[qi(t)]−τi[S(t)]qi(t)where Q−i(t)≡−qi(t)+∑ni=0 qi(t).
Following Bös (1991) and Matsumura (1998), private firms are considered to be profit maxi-
mizers while the privatized firm’s instantaneous objective is a weighted average of social wel-
fare and its own profit, f0(t) = (1− θ)w(t)+ θ pi0(t), where θ ∈ [0,1]. In this formulation,
the weight (1−θ) describes the extent to which the government is able to control the behavior
of the public firm through the shares that it has retained . If θ = 1 the privatized firm behaves
as a private oligopolist whereas if θ = 0 the privatized firm behaves as a welfare-maximizing
public firm . Here, θ is assumed to be exogenously given and readily observable by the firms.
Accordingly, each private firm solves
max
qi(t)≥0
Πi =
∫ ∞
0
pii(t)e−rtdt (4)
s.t. S˙(t) = Q(t)−δS(t), S(0) = S0 ≥ 0. (5)
whereas the privatized firm solves
max
q0(t)≥0
F0 =
∫ ∞
0
f0(t)e−rtdt, (6)
s.t. S˙(t) = Q(t)−δS(t), S(0) = S0 ≥ 0. (7)
The specific sets of strategies that are available to the firms depend on the information structure
of the game. In this paper we restrict our attention to open-loop (OL) and closed-loop (CL)
information structures. Under an OL-information structure, firms are unable to observe the
current state of the game. Consequently, they condition their strategies only on time. Namely,
each firm i (i = 1, . . . ,n) uses an OL-strategy; i.e., a decision rule of the form qi(t) = φi(t).
By contrast, under a CL-information structure, firms are able to observe the current state of
the game and use this information to revise their strategies at each point of time. Each firm i
(i= 1, . . . ,n) uses a CL-strategy; i.e., a decision rule of the form qi(t) = φi(S(t)). Whatever the
information structure considered, the relevant equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium. Let
us recall that an OL (CL) Nash equilibrium is a profile of OL (CL) strategies that are mutual
best responses.
The Environmental Regulator At a prior stage the environmental regulator determines the
system of linear Markov tax rules τ(S) = (τ0(S), . . . ,τn(S)) to regulate pollution. Having de-
termined firms’ optimal behaviors in the oligopoly subgame, it selects the tax scheme τ(S) so
as to maximize aggregate social welfare. Formally, the optimal tax scheme τˆe(S) is obtained
by solving
max
τ(S)
W e =
∫ ∞
0 w
e(t)e−rtdt, (8)
s.t. S˙(t) = Q(t)−δS(t),S(0) = S0 ≥ 0,q(t)≥ 0. (9)
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where the superscript e ∈ {ol,cl} indicates whether variables are evaluated at the OL or CL-
Nash equilibrium of the underlying dynamic oligopoly game2.
3 The Social Optimum
The social optimum can be obtained by solving problem (3)3. First we derive the necessary
conditions for optimality4. Second we characterize the steady state solution. Let λr denotes
the costate (or adjoint) variable associated with S˙. Assuming interior solutions, the maximum
principle implies the following necessary and sufficient optimality conditions
−λr = P(Q)−C′i(qi), ∀i = 0, . . . ,n, (10)
λ˙r = λrr−∂Hr/∂S = λr(r+δ )+D′(S), (11)
lim
t→∞e
−rtλr(t)S(t) = 0, (12)
along with equation (1). From Equation (10), the costate variable λr is negative and represents
the shadow cost of the pollution stock. Furthermore, solving these conditions yields
C′i(qi) =C
′
j(q j), ∀i = 0,1, . . . ,n. (13)
Optimality requires that the aggregate output be produced at least cost; i.e., marginal costs of
the last unit of output must be equal across firms. Using Equations (10) and (13) to eliminate
the social shadow cost from (11), we obtain the following system of equations
P′(Q)Q˙−C′′i (qi)q˙i = (r+δ )[P(Q)−C′i(qi)]−D′(S), ∀i = 0,1, . . . ,n. (14)
The steady state is then defined by (qˆ∞0 +∑
n
i=1 qˆ
∞
i ) = Qˆ
∞ = δSˆ∞, where Sˆ∞ satisfies
P(δ Sˆ∞) = C′i(qˆ
∞
i )+D
′(Sˆ∞)/(r+δ ) (15)
and the optimal allocation of production is given by C′i(qˆ∞i )=C′j(qˆ∞j ), ∀i, j(i 6= j)∈{0,1, . . . ,n}.
Condition (15) states that production should be allocated so that marginal benefits equal marginal
production costs plus the present value of marginal external damages. It can be clearly seen
from above that firms’ ownership structure is immaterial from the point of view of the so-
cial planner. Indeed, social optimality requires exclusively that allocative efficiency and cost
efficiency conditions be satisfied.
4 Open-Loop Mixed Oligopoly
We assume that firms are unable to revise their production paths once they have made their
choices; i.e., we assume an open-loop information structure. An OL-Nash equilibrium is a
2Recall that w=CS(Q)+pi0+∑ni=1pii−D(S)+τ0(S)q0+∑ni=1 τi(S)qi where CS(Q) =
∫ Q
0 P(u)du− pQ is the
consumer’s surplus. Social welfare rewrites as
w =
∫ Q
0 P(u)du−P(Q)Q+P(Q)q0−C0(q0)− τ0(S)q0−∑ni=1(P(Q)qi−Ci(qi)− τi(S)qi)+∑ni=0 τi(S)qi−D(S),
=
∫ Q
0 P(u)du−∑ni=1 Ci(qi)−D(S).
3Detailed derivations are available in Claude and Tidball (2006)
4Because of the convexity properties of the problem, the necessary conditions are also sufficient conditions for
optimality.
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profile of OL-strategies such that no firm wishes to revise its strategy choice given the strategy
choices of its rivals. From this definition, it follows that each firms i (i = 1, . . . ,n) chooses
its time-path of production qi(.) so as to maximize its aggregate payoff taking as given the
production paths of all other players and the tax rule τi(S). The OL-Nash equilibrium requires
that the optimality conditions of the (n+ 1) optimal control problems hold simultaneously.
Assuming interior solutions, the optimality conditions are given by
P′(Q)qi+P(Q)−C′i(qi)− τi(S)+λi = 0, ∀i 6= 0, (16)
P(Q)−C′0(q0)+λ0+θ
[−τ0(S)+q0P′(Q)]= 0, (17)
λ˙i = λir−∂Hi/∂S = λi(r+δ )+ τ ′i (S)qi, ∀i 6= 0, (18)
λ˙0 = λ0r−∂H0/∂S = λ0(r+δ )+θτ ′0(S)q0+(1−θ)D′(S), (19)
together with (1) and the (n+ 1) transversality conditions, limt→∞ e−rtλi(t)S(t) = 0, ∀i =
0,1, . . . ,n. Using (16) to eliminate λi from (18), the following conditions obtain,
P′′Q˙ qi+P′q˙i+P′Q˙−C′′i q˙i− τ ′i S˙ = (r+δ )[P′qi+P−C′i− τi]− τ ′i qi, ∀i = 1, . . . ,n, (20)
where P = P(Q), C′i =C′i(qi) and τi = τi(S). Similarly, from (17) and (19), we get:
C′′0 q˙0−P′Q˙+θ
[
τ ′0S˙−P′′Q˙q0−P′q˙0
]
= (1−θ)D′+θτ ′0q0
+(r+δ )
[
C′0−P+θ
(
τ0−P′q0
)]
(21)
We proceed with the stability analysis of the system defined by (20) and (21) together with (1).
The OL-Nash equilibrium steady state pollution stock Sˆ∞ must satisfy the following system of
(n+1) equations:
(r+δ )(C′i−P) = (P′qi− τi)(r+δ )− τ ′i qi, ∀i = 1, . . . ,n, (22)
(r+δ )(C′0−P)+D′ = θ
[
(P′q0− τ0)(r+δ )− τ ′0q0+D′
]
. (23)
Now we are in a position to study how the environmental regulator can decentralize the social
optimum as an OL-Nash equilibrium of the oligopoly game. The regulator designs τ(S) so that
firms optimality conditions match the socially optimal conditions. By comparison of (20) with
(14) and (21) with (14), the following conditions obtain:
τ ′i S˙−P′′Q˙qi−P′q˙i− (r+δ )(τi−P′qi)+D′− τ ′i qi = 0, (24)
τ ′0S˙−P′′Q˙q0−P′q˙0− (r+δ )
(
τ0−P′q0
)
+D′− τ ′0q0 = 0. (25)
From Section 3, we know that (r+δ )(C′i−P(δ Sˆ∞))+D′(Sˆ∞)= 0, so that (22) and (23) become:
P(δ Sˆ∞) =C′i + τi(Sˆ
∞)+qi(Sˆ∞)
[
τ ′i (Sˆ
∞)/(r+δ )−P′(δ Sˆ∞)] , ∀i = 0, . . . ,n (26)
The profile of markovian tax rules τ(S) must satisfy conditions (24) and (25) and τ(Sˆ∞) must
satisfy the (n+1) steady state conditions (26). Clearly, these conditions are independent of θ .
We thus obtain the irrelevance result stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. When the environmental regulator uses efficiency inducing taxation in order
to regulate a polluting oligopoly, the optimal linear-Markov taxation scheme, the time-path of
pollution accumulation, firms’ time-paths of production and profit streams are identical irre-
spective of whether i) all (n+1) firms behave as profit maximizers or ii) a partially privatized
firm competes in quantities with n private firms.
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The basic intuition for proposition 1 is simple. To begin with, consider the two limiting
cases: the regulation of a private oligopoly and that of a pure mixed oligopoly. The first is
obtained by setting θ = 1 in the objective of the public firm. In this case, the public firm is a
profit maximizer and the problem boils down to the regulation of a private polluting oligopoly.
From Benchekroun and Van Long (1998), we know that there exists an optimal tax rule which
induces firms to follow the socially optimal production path. The second is obtained by set-
ting θ = 0. In this case, the privatized firm maximizes aggregated social welfare. Corrective
taxation does not affect the output decision of the public firm directly; the tax only affects the
behavior of the public firm through its effect on private firms’ output levels. Now, suppose that
the regulator uses the tax rule obtained in the private oligopoly case to regulate the pure mixed
oligopoly. Then, private firms follow the optimal production path. Since the public firm seeks
to maximize social welfare, its best response to the behavior of private firms is also to follow
the socially optimal production path.
Now, consider intermediate cases, θ ∈]0,1[, in which the partially privatized firm deviates from
strict welfare maximization without being exclusively profit oriented. Suppose that the regula-
tor uses the tax rule obtained in the private oligopoly case to regulate the mixed market. Now,
corrective taxation affects the behavior of the public firm directly since it appears in its profits.
Public and private owners of the public firm have an common interest in following the socially
optimal production path. Indeed, it would be the policy chosen by the public shareholders if
they were the unique owners of the privatized firm and the choice of private shareholders if
they were the unique owners of the privatized firm.
5 Closed-Loop Mixed Oligopoly
We now proceed by considering the broader class of CL-strategies in order to prove that our
irrelevance result is not contingent upon assumptions regarding the informational structure.
Since optimality conditions for private firms are independent of θ , we may restrict our attention
to the behavior of the partially privatized firm. Now, each firm assumes that the strategies used
by its competitors are a function of the accumulated stock. Accordingly, firm 0 chooses the
output path q∗0(t) which maximizes its discounted payoff F0 subject to (1). Let Q−0(S) =
∑ni=1φi(S). Assuming interior solutions, the optimality conditions are
λ0 = (C′0−P)+θ
[
τ0−q0P′
]
, (27)
λ˙0 = (1−θ)
[
∑ni=1C′iφ ′i +D′−PQ′−0
]
+θq0
[
τ ′0−P′Q′−0
]
+λ0
[
(r+δ )−Q′−0
]
, (28)
together with (1) and limt→∞ e−rtλ0(t)S(t) = 0. Following the same steps as in Section 4, one
obtains the following condition on τ∗0 (S):
Λ+Q′−0 (τ0+(C
′
i−P)) = 0 (29)
where Λ= τ ′0S˙−P′′Q˙q0−P′q˙0− (r+δ )(τ0−P′q0)+D′− τ ′0q0 is the bracketed term in (25).
Again, we observe that this equation will be satisfied or not regardless of the value of θ . Fur-
thermore, following the same steps as in Section 4, it is straightforward to show that the cor-
responding steady state condition is independent of θ . The system of linear Markov tax rules
must satisfy a system of differential equations that is independent of θ and thus the following
proposition obtains:
Proposition 5.1. When the environmental regulator uses efficiency inducing taxation in order
to regulate a polluting oligopoly, the optimal linear-Markov taxation scheme, the time-path of
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pollution accumulation, firms’ time-paths of production and profit streams are identical irre-
spective of whether i) all (n+1) firms behave as profit maximizers or ii) a partially privatized
firm competes in quantities with n private firms.
6 Conclusion
We considered efficiency-inducing taxation for a polluting oligopoly in which a partially pri-
vatized firm competes with private firms. The analysis of this paper provided some answers
to hitherto neglected questions about the interaction between privatization and environmental
taxation. Assuming that the partially privatized firm maximizes a weighted average of social
welfare and its own profit, we proved that the optimal corrective tax scheme is independent of
the weight the privatized firm puts on its own profit; i.e., the extent of privatization. This result
tells us that technologically identical privatized and private firms should be taxed the same even
if they have different incentives to produce. It was shown that this conclusion holds regardless
of whether firms use OL or CL strategies. Turning to the welfare effect of privatization, we
proved that social welfare is unchanged by privatization when the optimal environmental pol-
icy is implemented. Indeed, we showed that the optimal environmental policy decentralizes
the social optimum. Then, since the social optimum is unique and the optimal tax policy is
independent of the extent of privatization, the same level of aggregate welfare is achieved irre-
spective of the ownership status of the public firm.
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